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Abstract
This paper studies the institution of bankruptcy when exclusive con-
tracts cannot be enforced ex ante, e.g., a bank cannot monitor whether the
borrower enters into contracts with other creditors. The institution of bank-
ruptcy enables the bank to enforce its claim to any funds that the borrower
has above a ﬁxed “bankruptcy protection” level. Bankruptcy improves on
non-exclusive contractual relationships but is not a perfect substitute for
exclusivity ex ante. We characterize the eﬀect of bankruptcy provisions on
the equilibrium contracts which borrowers use to raise ﬁnancing.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of bankruptcy in an environment in which borrowers
can enter into multiple credit relationships which are not observed by all parties,
i.e., in which contracts are non-exclusive. Speciﬁcally, we consider the problem
of a bank which can not ex ante write contracts contingent on the total assets
and liabilities of a borrower, since subsequent contractual relationships are not
observed by the bank. The inability to enforce exclusivity ex ante constrains the
contracts that the borrower is able to obtain. In our model, the institution of
bankruptcy enables the bank to enforce its claim to any funds exceeding a ﬁxed
amount, the “bankruptcy protection” level. It allows the bank to ensure that the
borrower keeps no more than that ﬁxed amount. Bankruptcy hence alleviates the
non-exclusivity problem and is valuable.
We explicitly model the inability to make contracts contingent on subsequent
contractual relationships by assuming that such relationships are unobservable.1
Our focus is on the role which bankruptcy plays in limiting the externalities across
contracts and on the eﬀect of bankruptcy provisions on the equilibrium contracts
which borrowers and lenders enter into ex ante.2 In contrast, much of the existing
literature focuses on the role of bankruptcy in conﬂict resolution amongst creditors
ex post, i.e., after insolvency.3 ,4
We study the problem of a borrower or entrepreneur who needs to raise ﬁnanc-
ing from a primary lender, which we call the “bank,” and who can raise additional
funds from secondary lenders.5 The borrower is subject to moral hazard and needs
1See Arnott and Stiglitz (1983) for a pioneering analysis in economies with hidden action
and, more recently, Bisin and Guaitoli (1998), Bizer and DeMarzo (1992, 1999) and Kahn and
Mookherjee (1998). Allen (1985), Fudenberg, Holmstro¨m, and Milgrom (1990), and Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001) study related environments with diﬀerent forms of non-exclusivity, namely
hidden borrowing and lending and hidden storage, respectively. A related literature discusses
the opportunistic access to secondary markets in the case of equity (see Admati, Pﬂeiderer and
Zechner (1994) and references therein).
2See Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2003) and Zame (1993) for a general equilibrium
analysis of contracts with default provisions and Schwartz (1997) for an analysis of the distinction
between contracts with default provisions and bankruptcy institutions.
3See, e.g., Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), Bebchuk (1988), and Cornelli and Felli (1998)
for models which focus on the division of the debtor’s assets among lenders in the event of
insolvency. Models which study the eﬀect of bankruptcy on contracting ex ante include Berglo¨f,
Roland, and von Thadden (2003) who study the eﬀect on the equilibrium capital structure of
ﬁrms and Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender (1997) who study the eﬀect on ﬁrm speciﬁc investment.
4We underplay the classical argument for bankruptcy institutions, namely that they avoid
uncoordinated actions by creditors aﬀecting the debtor’s assets in case of his inability to repay
(see, e.g., Baird (1993)), in order to highlight the most novel components of our analysis.
5See Berglo¨f and von Thadden (1994), Biais and Gollier (1997), Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Winton (1995) for
models of multiple lending relationships in equilibrium. For evidence on multiple contractual
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to be given incentives to exert eﬀort.
The institution of bankruptcy in our set-up has two essential elements: First,
it enables the bank to enforce its claim to any assets that the borrower has above
a ﬁxed bankruptcy protection level. In particular, the bank can seize payoﬀs of
secondary contracts which the borrower would be due to receive. The bank can
thus enforce a speciﬁc consumption allocation for the borrower in bankruptcy. A
necessary condition for this is that the payments which the borrower makes or
receives are observable in bankruptcy. Second, it provides a level of bankruptcy
protection to the borrower in the form of a guaranteed payoﬀ for the entrepreneur.
We ﬁrst characterize the eﬀects of non-exclusivity of contracts due to the in-
ability to write contracts contingent on the total assets and liabilities of a borrower
in a benchmark economy without this bankruptcy institution. We show that the
inability to enforce exclusivity clauses has two eﬀects on the optimal contract
compared to exclusive contracts. First, it reduces the insurance provided by the
repayment schedule of the bank’s loan against the possibility that the project fails.
Second, it reduces the amount that the entrepreneur can borrow. By reducing the
amount of insurance, the bank leaves the borrower with more resources in states
where the project is successful. With low eﬀort such resources have lower expected
value and are hence less valuable. This makes it more costly for the borrower to
deviate to low eﬀort and trade with secondary lenders.
We then introduce the bankruptcy institution into this environment where
exclusive contracts are not otherwise enforceable. In this case, the bank chooses
a repayment schedule which induces the entrepreneur to declare bankruptcy if
and only if the project fails. Since the bank can seize any additional assets that
the borrower might have if these exceed the bankruptcy protection level, the
borrower has no incentive to acquire such assets ex ante. Indeed, the borrower
is not tempted to save in secondary markets, but, if anything, would consider
taking out additional loans. This is in contrast to the counterintuitive result in
the standard principal agent analysis of credit relationships (see, e.g., Rogerson
(1985)) that the borrower is tempted to save in secondary markets.6
Furthermore, the bank can ensure that secondary lenders are repaid only if the
bank has been repaid in full, which means that debt in secondary markets will not
be repaid when the project fails. Hence, the entrepreneur can not borrow from
secondary lenders against the state in which he declares bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
thus restricts the set of contracts that the entrepreneur can enter into in the
secondary market.
If the bankruptcy protection level is chosen appropriately, the institution of
bankruptcy alleviates the incentive problem resulting from the non-exclusivity of
relationships see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1997).
6See however Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) for an important exception.
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contracts and is welfare improving. Furthermore, the optimal contract oﬀered by
the bank provides the entrepreneur with more insurance and a larger loan than is
provided under the optimal contract in the absence of bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy institution in our model provides a level of bankruptcy pro-
tection to the borrower and hence limits the liability of the borrower. This level
of bankruptcy protection is a crucial and endogenous element of the institution of
bankruptcy rather than an exogenous friction. Thus, being generous to the insider
is optimal in our model. In practice, provisions in the corporate bankruptcy code
which are lenient to the insiders, namely Chapter 11, eﬀectively provide some
bankruptcy protection to insiders.7 Under Chapter 11 the debtor is allowed to
restructure after disclosing the books to the court and possibly proceed with the
project. Similarly, the frequent attribution of control rights to the insiders as
well as the extensively documented deviations from absolute priority in favor of
insiders (see, e.g., Franks and Torous (1989))8 provide implicit bankruptcy protec-
tion.9 Moreover, for individual bankruptcy, which is often applied to bankruptcies
of entrepreneurial ﬁrms, the U.S. Code explicitly speciﬁes insurance provisions,
in the form of the fresh start policy for individual debtors.10 Our model suggests
that this generosity towards insiders is beneﬁcial because borrowers need to be
induced to declare bankruptcy since bankruptcy enables the bank to enforce its
claim. This is valuable for contracting ex ante. In contrast, the literature which
studies the role of bankruptcy in resolving conﬂicts between creditors ex post fo-
cuses on the costs of generosity and questions the role of restructuring procedures
which are generous to insiders.11
We then show that the institution of bankruptcy is not a perfect substitute for
the enforceability of exclusive contracts, however. Bankruptcy restricts the set of
contracts oﬀered to the entrepreneur in the secondary market considerably. This
reduces the ex ante non-exclusivity problem and is valuable. But it is not equiv-
7See Baird (1993) for an introduction to the bankruptcy code and Berkovitch and Israel
(1999) for a comparative analysis of bankruptcy laws.
8Notice that the focus here is on violations of absolute priority between insiders and outsiders
rather then between lenders with diﬀerent seniority.
9This interpretation is admittedly loose, since we do not model restructuring procedures
explicitly. For the case of individual bankruptcy however, Baird (1993), for instance, stresses
that one of the main purposes of the Code is that it “allows creditors to scrutinize the debtor’s
aﬀairs and, assuming no misbehavior is found, it provides the debtor with a fresh start” (p. 32).
10Liquidation procedures, as in Chapter 7 of the U.S. Code, are seen mainly as a device which
limits the diversion of assets away from senior claimants. Consistently Baird (1993) argues that
“[t]he purpose of allowing corporations to ﬁle Chapter 7 petitions is not so much to give creditors
assets, as it is to assure creditors that the corporation has no assets” (p. 15). See also Schwartz
(1989).
11Aghion, Hart, and Moore’s bankruptcy reform, for instance, calls for a variant of the liqui-
dation procedure contained in Chapter 7 and the abandonment of the restructuring procedures
of Chapter 11 (see also Hart et al. (1997)).
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alent to being able to enforce a speciﬁc consumption allocation for the borrower
in all states. The repayment schedule oﬀered by the bank must still be such that
the entrepreneur has no incentive to choose any secondary contracts.12
We believe that the environment we analyze captures an important element
of credit markets. The secondary credit market for instance does not have to be
interpreted literally as borrowing from a second bank, although this is a possible
interpretation. Trade credit, which is an important source of ﬁnancing for ﬁrms in
the United States (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1997)), can also be a secondary
source of funds. So can other providers of working capital through accounts
payable, such as employees or the tax authority. The secondary source may also
be credit card ﬁnancing in addition to a primary bank loan (in particular for small
ﬁrms) or unsecured, informal lending supplementing a ﬁrst, formal loan. Also, the
focus of the paper is on unsecured lending, i.e., loans that are not collateralized
by speciﬁc assets, which is an important source of ﬁnancing especially for small
ﬁrms.13
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes and compares the optimal contracts in three environments. In Sec-
tion 3.1 we characterize the optimal exclusive contract, i.e., the optimal contract
with neither a secondary credit market nor bankruptcy. In Section 3.2 we study
non-exclusive credit relationships when there is no bankruptcy institution. In
Section 3.3 we consider the eﬀect of the institution of bankruptcy when credit
relationships are non-exclusive. Section 4 provides a discussion of some of the
assumptions, implications, and possible extensions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We study an economy in which an entrepreneur needs to borrow to ﬁnance a
project. The probability of success of the project depends on a costly unobserv-
able action by the entrepreneur. A bank ﬁnancing the project schedules repay-
ments, conditional on the outcome of the project, such that the entrepreneur has
an incentive to take the action which maximizes the value of the project. We
consider and compare three cases: i) The bank is the only lender, and the en-
trepreneur cannot declare bankruptcy. ii) The entrepreneur can raise funds in
addition to those obtained from the bank from “secondary lenders.” The bank
cannot condition the repayment schedule of the loan on the total funds raised by
the entrepreneur, because the bank does not observe subsequent contractual re-
12This result contrasts with the result derived by Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) in an interesting
related paper which is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
13The fraction of loans to ﬁrms with less than 500 employees which are not collateralized is
31% in data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances.
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lationships of the entrepreneur, and the entrepreneur cannot declare bankruptcy.
iii) The entrepreneur can raise funds in addition to those obtained from the bank.
The bank cannot condition the repayment schedule of the loan on the total funds
raised by the entrepreneur, but the entrepreneur can declare bankruptcy. If he
does declare bankruptcy, the bank can ensure that the borrower does not keep
any funds exceeding a ﬁxed amount (the level of “bankruptcy protection”), and
the entrepreneur consumes a ﬁxed, predetermined amount. In other words, the
institution of bankruptcy in our model has two essential components: First, it
enables the bank to seize any funds that the borrower has in excess of the bank-
ruptcy protection level up to the amount of its loan if bankruptcy is declared.
Second, it provides a level of bankruptcy protection to the borrower in the form
of a guaranteed allocation for the entrepreneur. Thus, we assume that in bank-
ruptcy the enforcement of the seniority of the bank’s claim with respect to the
entrepreneur’s claim is limited by the bankruptcy protection level.
2.1 The Economy
We consider a simple economy with two dates 0 and 1, and one single consumption
good that is populated by an entrepreneur and several agents which operate in
credit markets. We will distinguish between an agent which will take the role of
the main creditor of the entrepreneur, which, for concreteness, we call the bank,
and all the other potential creditors which populate what we call the secondary
credit market.
The Entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is endowed with α < 1 units of the
good at time 0 and has the opportunity to start a project, which requires an
investment of 1 unit of the consumption good at time 0. At time 1, the project
yields ωH units of the consumption good with probability πa and ωL units of
the consumption good with probability 1− πa. a denotes an unobservable action
by the entrepreneur, eﬀort toward the success of the project, which aﬀects the
probability distribution of the outcome of the project, and takes two values, e
and E. Without loss of generality, ωH > ωL and πE > πe, so that ωH takes the
interpretation of ‘high’ realization of the output of the project and E of ‘high’
eﬀort.
The entrepreneur has preferences represented by a continuous, smooth, strictly
monotonic increasing, strictly concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion, u : R+ → R. Denoting consumption at time 0 and 1 with c0 and c1,
respectively, the entrepreneur’s lifetime utility is
U = u(c0) + E[u(c1)|a]− v(a),
where E[·|a] denotes the expectation conditional on action a. This speciﬁcation of
preferences assumes separability of consumption and eﬀort and no discounting for
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tractability. Consistent with the interpretation of E as ‘high’ eﬀort, we assume
v(E) > v(e).
The entrepreneur ﬁnances his project in the credit markets. All agents in the
credit markets are identical, risk neutral and ready to invest in the entrepreneur’s
project, i.e., there is free entry. The ﬁrst agent the entrepreneur enters into a
contractual relationship with will have the special role of the primary creditor
and will be called the bank.
The Bank. At time 0, the bank provides the entrepreneur with funds I ∈ R
(possibly negative) to operate the project and/or smooth consumption. It sets
state contingent repayments for time 1, (BH , BL), to maximize expected proﬁts.
14
Expected proﬁts are evaluated at the entrepreneur’s equilibrium action a ∈ {e, E},
and at the equilibrium repayment levels (B˜H , B˜L) in case the entrepreneur decides
not to fully repay his debt. Since we assume no discounting, we set the exogenous
interest rate to 0, and the bank’s expected proﬁts are:
πaB˜H + (1− πa)B˜L − I.
The entrepreneur, after entering the contractual relationship with the bank, might
trade with secondary lenders in the secondary credit market.
The Secondary Lenders. Any secondary lender observes I, BH, BL, and
then potentially provides the entrepreneur at time 0 with extra credit, γ ∈ R
(possibly negative), and a state contingent repayment scheme at time 1, (RH , RL),
also to maximize expected proﬁts evaluated at the entrepreneur’s equilibrium
action a ∈ {e, E}, and equilibrium repayment levels (R˜H , R˜L): πaR˜H + (1 −
πa)R˜L − γ.
The Bankruptcy Institution. The entrepreneur might decide not to repay
his debt with the bank and/or with the secondary lenders. In this case, i) the bank
can ensure that the entrepreneur can not keep any funds exceeding a ﬁxed amount,
the bankruptcy protection level P , and ii) the entrepreneur receives a ﬁxed amount
of P units of consumption. Speciﬁcally, the bank receives the diﬀerence between
the output of the project plus any positive payoﬀs of other claims the entrepreneur
might have and P , up to the full credit amount. The bank hence enforces the
seniority of its loan which is however limited by the bankruptcy protection level of
the borrower. Secondary lenders are partially reimbursed if and only if the bank
is fully repaid.15 We assume that the secondary lenders get equal shares of the
proceeds in bankruptcy, up to the amount of their loan. As we discuss in Section 4,
14We assume that the bank can commit to the contract it oﬀers, including the repayment
schedule, at time 0. See Park (2003) for the case in which the bank can renegotiate at time 1
after the eﬀort choice of the entrepreneur but before the outcome of the project.
15If the output of the project is suﬃcient to repay all of the entrepreneur’s debt after guar-
anteeing himself at least P , there is no reason for him not to repay and declare bankruptcy.
Notice that, out of equilibrium, if bankruptcy is declared when there are enough resources to
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this speciﬁc assumption about the sharing rule in bankruptcy is not critical for our
main conclusion. It simpliﬁes the characterization of the solution by allowing us to
essentially ignore the strategic interaction in the secondary market and proceed as
if there were only one secondary lender. Notice that in bankruptcy the bank can
only enforce its claim to any funds exceeding the bankruptcy protection level that
the borrower has, and can not impose more general penalties on either secondary
lenders or the borrower even if the borrower has violated the exclusivity covenants.
Courts. While we do not model courts explicitly as an agent in the economy,
it is important to stress that our bankruptcy institution can be implemented
by courts as follows. The contract between the bank and the entrepreneur is
deposited in court, or in a credit bureau operated by the courts, and therefore
registered and dated. Whenever bankruptcy is called, the courts verify the state
of insolvency of the entrepreneur and enforce the bank’s claim on funds exceeding
the bankruptcy protection level. All private contracts put forward to the courts in
the state of insolvency, even those not registered in the credit bureau, are honored
by the bankruptcy process. The bank can (and will, without loss of generality)
register its contract and impose an exclusivity covenant, therefore eliminating any
possible seniority structure between potential secondary lenders, which then have
no incentive to deposit their contracts with the credit bureau. This justiﬁes our
assumption that secondary lenders are repaid equal shares of what is left after
reimbursing the bank holding what is eﬀectively a senior claim and providing the
entrepreneur with P units of consumption.
2.2 Assumptions
We impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 Preferences satisfy limc→0 u′(c) = ∞, limc→0 u(c) = −∞ and are
extended to the entire real line with u(c) = −∞ for c < 0.
This assumption guarantees positivity of consumption in equilibrium. Further-
more, the assumption formally guarantees that the agent never wants to enter
into inconsistent contracts that result in negative consumption.
Assumption 2 Lower bound on the expected rate of return of the project:
πeωH + (1− πe)ωL > 1.
The expected rate of return implied by the project, when operated at the low
eﬀort e, is πeωH + (1 − πe)ωL, while the safe rate of return of the economy is 1.
repay all lenders, we assume that the entrepreneur would still receive a consumption of P only,
and hence resources would be wasted.
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Assumption 2 requires production eﬃciency of the project at eﬀort e. Alterna-
tively, the assumption requires that an agent would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in
the project, operate it at the low eﬀort e, fully insure the outcome of the project
at fair prices, and perfectly smooth his consumption at the safe rate of return 1,
rather than not operating the project and smoothing his consumption, which is
deterministic if the project is not operated.
Let ce ≡ 12 (α− 1 + πeωH + (1− πe)ωL) be the consumption allocation at each
date and state of the world of an agent choosing a = e in the case of perfect
smoothing and full insurance.
Assumption 3 Lower bound on the relative productivity of high eﬀort E:
πEu(ωH − Ie) + (1− πE)u(ωL − Ie)− v(E) > u(ce)− v(e)
where Ie is the level of borrowing or lending which supports consumption ce at
t = 0, i.e., Ie ≡ ce − (α− 1).
Assumption 3 requires that, when consuming ce at time 0, the agent would prefer
to operate the project at the high eﬀort E without insurance rather than operating
the project at the low eﬀort e and fully insuring the outcome of the project.
Finally, we will also assume that preferences and the parameters of the econ-
omy are such that the bank’s non-negative expected proﬁt condition holds with
equality. This is always the case when contracts are exclusive, but is not a forgone
conclusion when contracts are non-exclusive (see Section 3.2 and 3.3). A simple
suﬃcient condition is, for example, that preferences satisfy u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ with σ < 1
or u(c) = ln(c).
3 Equilibrium Contracts
In equilibrium, the entrepreneur chooses the agent with which he enters into a
primary contractual relationship, i.e., the bank he deals with. Moreover, the en-
trepreneur trades in the secondary credit market, thereby choosing the secondary
lenders he deals with. Given the aggregate contractual position he has entered
into, and given the bankruptcy institution, the entrepreneur chooses the eﬀort
he exerts toward the success of the project and a bankruptcy declaration and
repayment strategy contingent on the state of the world (i.e., the outcome of the
project). The bank chooses which contract to oﬀer, anticipating the entrepreneur’s
trades in the secondary credit market, and anticipating the eﬀort and bankruptcy
declaration and repayment decisions of the entrepreneur. The secondary lenders
choose which contracts to oﬀer, knowing the terms of the contract between the en-
trepreneur and the bank, and anticipating the eﬀort and bankruptcy declaration
and repayment decisions of the entrepreneur.
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We do not explicitely describe the mechanism by which the entrepreneur
chooses the agent which acts as the bank, or the agents to deal with in the
secondary credit market. We instead postulate free entry in both the primary
and the secondary credit markets, and hence will characterize contracts which
maximize the entrepreneur’s expected utility provided these contracts satisfy the
non-negative expected proﬁt condition for the bank and the secondary lenders.
This is just for simplicity. A simple mechanism which supports free entry can
easily be constructed.16
Before studying the equilibrium in our economy with unobservable eﬀort, sec-
ondary lenders, and bankruptcy, we analyze the equilibrium of an economy in
which exclusive contracts can be enforced as a benchmark.17
3.1 Exclusive Contracts and No Bankruptcy
In this subsection, we consider the case in which banks have the ability to impose
exclusivity clauses on the entrepreneurs (perhaps because they can observe their
trades), and thus secondary lenders do not operate. We also assume that there is
no bankruptcy institution in the economy and agents are required to keep their
promises. Indeed, since with exclusive contracts the bank knows exactly how
many funds the agent has in each state of the world and hence how much he
consumes, a bankruptcy institution as described above would not add any value
here. This will of course change once we consider non-exclusive contracts.
The environment with exclusive contracts is in fact the standard principal
agent model of borrowing and lending which we use as a benchmark (see Rogerson
(1985)). Because we assume that many agents can act as banks (free entry),
in equilibrium the bank will choose to oﬀer the entrepreneur a contract which
maximizes the entrepreneur’s utility, provided the contract satisﬁes the bank’s
non-negative expected proﬁt condition.
Assumptions 1-3 imply that an optimal contract is characterized by a = E
and α + I > 1. To induce eﬀort E, the contract must satisfy an incentive con-
straint. The optimal contract oﬀered by the bank is the solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
I,BH ,BL
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH − BH) + (1− πE)u(ωL − BL)− v(E) (1)
16For instance, the following mechanism would do: Agents have the option to oﬀer a primary
credit contract to the entrepreneur in an exogenous order. The entrepreneur, accepting one
such contract, stops the sequence of oﬀers. The secondary market, in which agents make oﬀers
simultaneously, then opens, and the entrepreneur accepts as many oﬀers as he pleases.
17Under full information (observable eﬀort) the optimal contract is characterized by high
eﬀort (a = E), perfect smoothing (c0 = πEcH + (1 − πE)cL) and full insurance (cH = cL), i.e.,
c0 = cH = cL = 12 (α− 1 + πEωH + (1− πE)ωL).
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subject to
πEBH + (1− πE)BL ≥ I (2)
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH − BH) + (1− πE)u(ωL − BL)− v(E) ≥ (3)
u(α + I − 1) + πeu(ωH − BH) + (1− πe)u(ωL −BL)− v(e).
The optimal contract maximizes the utility of the entrepreneur (1), subject to
the non-negative expected proﬁt condition of the bank (2), and the incentive
compatibility constraint (3). Let (I∗, B∗H , B
∗
L) denote the optimal contract oﬀered
by the bank. Similarly, let (c∗0, c
∗
H , c
∗
L) denote the equilibrium allocation of the
entrepreneur (i.e., his consumption at the optimal contract).
The following proposition characterizes the consumption allocation of the en-
trepreneur at the optimal contract (see Rogerson (1985)).
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold, contractual relationships are ex-
clusive, and there is no bankruptcy institution. Then,
c∗H ≡ ωH −B∗H > c∗L ≡ ωL − B∗L (partial insurance),
and
u′(c∗0) < πEu
′(c∗H) + (1− πE)u′(c∗L) (imperfect smoothing).
Moreover, if 1/u′ is convex, then
c∗0 = α + I
∗ − 1 > πEc∗H + (1− πE)c∗L.
If 1/u′ is concave, the last inequality is reversed.18
All proofs are in the Appendix unless noted otherwise. Notice that imperfect
smoothing is (constrained) optimal independent of the precautionary savings eﬀect
driven by the curvature of marginal utility: In fact, with linear marginal utility
(quadratic preferences) savings are restricted in equilibrium, and c∗0 = α+I
∗−1 >
πEc
∗
H + (1− πE)c∗L.
3.2 Non-exclusive Contracts and No Bankruptcy
We now consider the case in which contractual relationships in the credit market
are non-exclusive: Secondary lenders, as well as a bank, can provide the entre-
preneur with credit. The bank cannot condition the terms of its contract on the
entrepreneur’s trades in the secondary credit market because these trades cannot
be observed. For the moment, though, we assume that there is no institution
18The borderline case is thus logarithmic utility (1/u′ linear) for which consumption is a
martingale: c∗0 = πEc
∗
H + (1− πE)c∗L.
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of bankruptcy. That is, the entrepreneur can not default on his debt obligations
and declare bankruptcy, thereby allowing the bank to ensure that he has no ad-
ditional funds from trades in secondary markets. The eﬀect of such an institution
on contracting will be considered in the next subsection.
The determination of the equilibrium contractual relationships between the
bank, the entrepreneur, and the secondary lenders, as well as the equilibrium
allocation of the entrepreneur, is not straightforward. However, as in the case
discussed in the previous subsection, the equilibrium allocation of the entrepreneur
can be uniquely determined by the solution to a programming problem. We
construct such a problem below.
Note that the bank and any of the secondary lenders are identical in terms of
objectives (they are risk neutral and maximize expected proﬁts) and in terms of
contract space. This implies that any agent can act as the bank, and free entry
ensures that the contract oﬀered by the bank involves zero expected proﬁts in
equilibrium (after the entrepreneur’s trading with secondary lenders) given our
assumptions. Furthermore, any allocation for the entrepreneur can be supported
by a single contract with the bank, and no relationship with any of the secondary
lenders. In other words, the set of contracts that the secondary creditors could
oﬀer the entrepreneur can also be oﬀered by the bank ex ante.19
The equilibrium allocation for the entrepreneur can then be supported as an
optimal contract restricted to one in which secondary lenders are inactive, i.e.,
γ = RH = RL = 0, provided the entrepreneur does not have any incentive to
choose a joint deviation of supplying eﬀort e and supplementing the bank’s credit
with secondary credit (an incentive compatibility constraint). In other words, the
contract oﬀered by the bank in equilibrium will be such that the entrepreneur has
no reason to enter into a contract with one or several secondary lenders in order
to create a portfolio which induces him to exert low eﬀort, thereby reducing the
expected repayment to the bank.
Finally, in the secondary market for credit, again because of free entry, the
entrepreneur is able to obtain a contract which maximizes his utility given the
contract oﬀered by the bank provided each secondary lender makes zero expected
proﬁts in equilibrium. (Note that this is essentially independent of the speciﬁc
strategic interactions between secondary lenders in the market.)
Since Assumptions 1-3 imply that the optimal contract is characterized by
a = E and α + I > 1, the optimal contract with secondary lenders and no
bankruptcy is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
I,BH ,BL
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH − BH) + (1− πE)u(ωL − BL)− v(E) (4)
19There is thus no intrinsic role for ﬁnancing by the secondary lenders in our model. It would
be an interesting extension to study an environment in which secondary ﬁnancing would play a
non-degenerate role.
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subject to
πEBH + (1− πE)BL ≥ I (5)
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH − BH) + (1− πE)u(ωL − BL)− v(E) ≥ (6)
u(α + I + γ − 1) + πeu(ωH − BH − RH) + (1− πe)u(ωL −BL −RL)− v(e)
for all (γ,RH , RL) which satisfy
πeRH + (1− πe)RL ≥ γ. (7)
The optimal contract maximizes the expected utility of the entrepreneur (4),
subject to the non-negative expected proﬁt condition of the bank (5), and the
incentive compatibility constraint (6). In specifying the incentive compatibility
constraint (6), we restrict the set of contracts oﬀered in the secondary market
to those which satisfy (7), i.e., non-negative expected proﬁts for the secondary
lenders. Lemma 1 shows that we can further simplify the incentive compatibility
constraint (6), since the borrower will choose to fully insure using the secondary
markets when he chooses low eﬀort. Moreover, Lemma 1 shows that the incentive
constraint when the borrower has access to the secondary credit market, (6), is
more restrictive than when he does not, (3), since by trading in this market the
entrepreneur can optimally tailor his consumption to the case in which he chooses
the low eﬀort e. This also implies that the borrower is better oﬀ when exclusive
contracts are enforceable than when they are not.
Lemma 1 (i) Constraint (6) can be replaced by
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH −BH) + (1− πE)u(ωL −BL)− v(E) ≥ 2u(c)− v(e) (8)
where
c ≡ 1
2
(α + I − 1 + πe(ωH − BH) + (1− πe)(ωL − BL)). (9)
(ii) Constraint (6) is more restrictive than (3).
Notice that the value to the entrepreneur of a joint deviation to eﬀort e and to
secondary credit increases with the present value of wealth after the bank loan
has been received, α + I − 1 + πe(ωH − BH) + (1 − πe)(ωL − BL), or, using the
bank’s non-negative expected proﬁt condition at equality, with α − 1 + πeωH +
(1−πe)ωL +(πE−πe)(BH −BL), and hence it increases with (BH −BL). To keep
the borrower from trading with secondary lenders, the bank has to make it costly
for the borrower to do so. By reducing the diﬀerence between BH and BL, i.e., by
reducing the amount of insurance provided, the bank makes the borrower’s budget
given low eﬀort tighter, which makes it more costly for the borrower to deviate.
13
Indeed, this intuition is reﬂected in the properties of the optimal non-exclusive
contract discussed below.
Importantly, note that in our economy with hidden eﬀort, the possibility of
entering into additional contracts can distort the ex ante eﬀort choice and hence
the probability with which the speciﬁed repayments to the bank are being made.
If the borrower were to exert low eﬀort, the expected repayment would be reduced
even if the borrower were to make the speciﬁed repayments to the bank. Hence,
the allocation is bounded away from the optimal allocation with exclusivity.
Let (c∗∗0 , c
∗∗
H , c
∗∗
L ) denote the equilibrium allocations of the debtor (i.e., his
consumption at the optimal contract). Similarly, let (I∗∗, B∗∗H , B
∗∗
L ) denote the
optimal contract oﬀered by the bank.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold, contractual relationships are non-
exclusive, and there is no bankruptcy institution. Then
c∗∗H ≡ ωH − B∗∗H > c∗∗L ≡ ωL − B∗∗L (partial insurance),
and
u′(c∗∗0 ) = πEu
′(c∗∗H ) + (1− πE)u′(c∗∗L ) (perfect smoothing).
Moreover, if u′ is convex, then
c∗∗0 ≡ α + I∗∗ − 1 < πEc∗∗H + (1− πE)c∗∗L .
If u′ is concave, the last inequality is reversed.20
Note that the incentive constraint with a secondary credit market implies that
the bank cannot use imperfect smoothing to relax the incentive problem. (In fact,
with quadratic preferences, and hence no precautionary savings motive, c∗∗0 =
α + I∗∗ − 1 = πEc∗∗H + (1 − πE)c∗∗L .) Thus, inducing the high eﬀort E is more
diﬃcult which is an additional reason why the amount of insurance that can be
oﬀered to the entrepreneur at the optimal contract is reduced by non-exclusivity.
We now compare the allocation at the optimal contract with and without a
secondary credit market to conﬁrm the intuition provided above. The main result
of this section is that in general non-exclusivity of contractual relationships has
the eﬀect of reducing both the amount of borrowing and the insurance the bank
can provide to the entrepreneur. More precisely,
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold, and there is no bankruptcy insti-
tution. Then:
20The borderline case is thus quadratic utility (u′ linear) for which consumption is a martin-
gale: c∗∗0 = α + I
∗∗ − 1 = πEc∗∗H + (1− πE)c∗∗L .
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(i) If 1/u′ is convex and u′′′ > 0, c∗∗0 < c
∗
0 (non-exclusivity reduces borrowing).
(ii) c∗∗H − c∗∗L > c∗H − c∗L and c∗∗H > c∗H (non-exclusivity reduces insurance).
It is not true for general utility functions that the optimal contract when the
secondary credit market is operating involves reduced borrowing, however. For
instance, with quadratic preferences (no precautionary savings) a similar argument
as the one in the proof of Proposition 3 shows that the optimal contract with
a secondary credit market involves higher borrowing. For the special case of
logarithmic utility Proposition 3 obviously implies that c∗∗0 < c
∗
0. Moreover, in this
case we have a sharper characterization of the insurance eﬀect, namely
c∗∗H
c∗∗L
>
c∗H
c∗L
.
It is also of interest to characterize the equilibrium deviation of the entrepre-
neur at the optimal contract. In other words, if the entrepreneur would actively
trade in the secondary credit market (remember that in equilibrium the entre-
preneur is indiﬀerent between trading and not trading in such markets), which
contract would he trade? Would such a contract involve borrowing or lending by
the entrepreneur?
More precisely, given the optimal contract oﬀered by the bank in equilibrium,
(I∗∗, B∗∗H , B
∗∗
L ), the equilibrium deviation of the entrepreneur is the solution to the
following maximization problem:
max
γ,RH ,RL
u(α+I∗∗+γ−1)+πeu(ωH−B∗∗H −RH)+(1−πe)u(ωL−B∗∗L −RL)−v(e),
subject to (7). Thus, the equilibrium deviation is the choice of (γ,RH , RL) at
which the incentive constraint holds with equality.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold, contractual relationships are non-
exclusive, there is no bankruptcy institution and u′ is concave or not too convex.
Then at the equilibrium deviation the entrepreneur would lend to the secondary
market, i.e., γ < 0.
A similar result, namely that an agent would like to save at the optimal contract
given the chance to do so, holds for economies in which the bank can enforce
exclusive contracts, a direct implication of Proposition 1 (see Rogerson (1985)). In
the literature this implication of principal agent models of borrowing and lending
markets is generally considered counterintuitive, since banks seem to be mostly
concerned with the possibility of debtors incurring excessive unobserved liabilities
in secondary markets, rather than with the possibility of unobserved saving. We
will show in the next subsection that this result is reversed when we allow for
bankruptcy, since in that case the entrepreneur at the optimal contract would
consider borrowing in secondary markets.
15
3.3 Non-exclusive Contracts and Bankruptcy
We now consider the case in which there exists a secondary market which can
provide the entrepreneur with credit in addition to what is already provided by
the bank, and in which the entrepreneur is allowed to default on his debt obliga-
tions and declare bankruptcy. In case of bankruptcy, the entrepreneur receives a
ﬁxed, predetermined amount of consumption P . The bank enforces its claim on
the entrepreneur’s funds exceeding P and hence the bank receives the diﬀerence
between the output of the project, plus any positive payoﬀs of other claims that
the entrepreneur might have and P , up to the full credit amount. The secondary
lenders are partially reimbursed if and only if the bank is fully repaid.
We will show that the optimal contract oﬀered by the bank induces the entre-
preneur to declare bankruptcy in the low state and only in the low state. This
implies that the entrepreneur will have no incentive to save for state L using sec-
ondary markets, because such savings would be seized by the bank and hence
go towards repaying the bank. The entrepreneur will also not be able to borrow
against the state L in secondary markets, because he could not repay such sec-
ondary loans unless the bank had been repaid in full. Thus, the ability of the
bank to enforce its claim on any funds that the entrepreneur has exceeding the
bankruptcy protection level in bankruptcy reduces the entrepreneur’s incentives
to trade in secondary markets. This enables the bank to provide more insurance
than in the absence of bankruptcy which improves the entrepreneur’s utility un-
der the optimal contract. Notice that the bankruptcy protection level P , which
limits the liability of the entrepreneur, is endogenously determined as part of the
optimal contract rather than an exogenous friction.
Importantly, we do not allow the level of bankruptcy protection P to be state
contingent. This restriction is necessary in our set-up to indirectly capture the
costs of bankruptcy, since we do not introduce explicit costs associated with the
bankruptcy procedure. If it were feasible and costless to make P state contingent,
the bank could enforce a speciﬁc consumption allocation for the entrepreneur for
free in all states and the optimal exclusive contract could hence be implemented.
We discuss this assumption in more detail in Section 4.21
As in the previous case we will transform the equilibrium analysis of the econ-
omy into the solution of a programming problem. The following preliminary
analysis simpliﬁes the statement of the problem. Recall that we want to show
that at an equilibrium the bank’s contract is set to induce the entrepreneur to
21We proceed as if the choice of P is part of the contract oﬀered by the bank. Implicitly, we
are thus determining the optimal bankruptcy protection level. More generally we should think
of the bankruptcy provisions as an ex ante (“political”) choice encompassing many or, in fact,
all contracts and taking borrower heterogeneity into account, but it makes no diﬀerence in the
simple economy we consider here.
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choose the high eﬀort E and to declare bankruptcy in state L only. Such a con-
tract exists, since in the relevant range of contracts the bank can always set the
notional repayment in state L, BL, suﬃciently high to ensure that the entrepre-
neur will be insolvent in that state, and only in that state, even after taking into
account the possibility of the borrower trading in the secondary credit market.
The optimal contract oﬀered by the bank and the equilibrium allocation in the
economy with non-exclusive contractual relationships and no bankruptcy, derived
in the previous subsection, are sustainable in the present environment with bank-
ruptcy. It is suﬃcient to set the bankruptcy provision P to 0. Furthermore, this
equilibrium allocation can be supported by a contract which induces bankruptcy
in state L by choosing the bankruptcy provisions appropriately. Such a contract,
(I, BH, BL, P ), will specify a high enough notional repayment in state L, BL, so
that the entrepreneur will be insolvent, declare bankruptcy and consume P , which
is set equal to the equilibrium allocation in state L which we want to support, c∗∗L .
We still need to check that the set of contracts which can be oﬀered to the
entrepreneur in the secondary market is not enlarged as a consequence of the
introduction of the bankruptcy institution, so that in equilibrium the secondary
market will remain inactive. This could only happen if the entrepreneur were
oﬀered a contract which he would accept and which would induce him to change
the pattern of bankruptcy declaration (for instance would induce him to declare
bankruptcy in state H and not in state L). The entrepreneur will declare bank-
ruptcy in each state of the world s ∈ {H,L} in which ωs − Bs − Rs < P . It
is easy to see that, by controlling BL, the bank can make it prohibitively costly
for secondary markets to change the pattern of bankruptcy declaration without
aﬀecting the equilibrium allocation of the entrepreneur (who never in fact repays
BL since he declares bankruptcy in state L).
The equilibrium allocation (c∗∗0 , c
∗∗
H , c
∗∗
L ) implies utility u
∗∗ for the entrepre-
neur. Could the entrepreneur reach higher utility with contracts with a diﬀerent
bankruptcy declaration pattern? We argue that the answer is no. Consider the
three possible alternative bankruptcy declaration patterns in turn:
First, suppose the entrepreneur goes bankrupt in both state H and state L.
Then he is fully insured, cH = cL = P , and chooses the low eﬀort, e. As a
consequence this contract is (weakly) dominated by the contract providing the
entrepreneur with full insurance and perfect smoothing and the bank with non-
negative expected proﬁts. But such a contract, under Assumptions 1-3, is in turn
strictly dominated by the contract which implements utility u∗∗, which we just
showed is feasible and incentive compatible under bankruptcy in L.
Second, suppose the entrepreneur never goes bankrupt, neither in state H nor
in state L. Then, if the utility for the entrepreneur associated with this contract
is at least u∗∗, P and BL can be chosen so that the entrepreneur is forced into
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bankruptcy in state L, while leaving his allocation and hence the utility associated
with the contract unchanged.
Finally, suppose the entrepreneur goes bankrupt only in state H . In this case
the consumption allocation in state L must necessarily be greater than the bank-
ruptcy provision (and hence the allocation in the bankruptcy state H): cL ≥ P .
It follows that the entrepreneur can never be induced to choose the high eﬀort E.
Again all possible allocations are then dominated by the allocation guaranteeing
utility u∗∗, which is feasible and incentive compatible under bankruptcy in L.
We have therefore demonstrated that in equilibrium the entrepreneur will de-
clare bankruptcy in state L only. We can then restrict the set of contracts oﬀered
by the bank without loss of generality to those which induce bankruptcy only
in state L. This implies that any contract oﬀered by the secondary market will
specify a zero repayment in state L. Since in bankruptcy any assets exceeding
the bankruptcy protection P will be assigned to the bank as repayment, the en-
trepreneur has no incentive to set RL negative. Similarly, since the entrepreneur
goes bankrupt in state L, he will not honor liabilities with secondary lenders, and
thus RL can not be positive.
More speciﬁcally, we can without loss of generality restrict the contract oﬀered
by the bank to one which satisﬁes
ωH −BH > P (10)
and BL suﬃciently high, in particular,
BL > ωL − P (11)
and thus we can, again without loss of generality, restrict the contracts oﬀered in
the secondary market to satisfy:
RL = 0, πeRH ≥ γ (12)
ωH − BH − RH ≥ P. (13)
To specify the optimal contracting problem solved by the bank, therefore,
we need to characterize the entrepreneur’s utility associated with a deviation
to eﬀort e and optimal trading in the secondary credit market for any contract
oﬀered by the bank. Given any contract oﬀered by the bank, (I, BH , BL, P ),
which satisﬁes properties (10-11), the utility that the entrepreneur can reach by
optimally deviating, that is by choosing eﬀort e and trading in the secondary
market, is
uD(I, BH , BL, P ) ≡ max
RH ,γ
u(α + I + γ − 1) + πeu(ωH − BH − RH) (14)
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+(1− πe)u(P )− v(e)
subject to
πeRH ≥ γ
ωH −BH − RH ≥ P.22
The optimal contracting problem can then be written as:
max
I,BH ,BL,P
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH −BH) + (1− πE)u(P )− v(E) (15)
subject to
πEBH + (1− πE)(ωL − P ) ≥ I (16)
and the incentive constraint:
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH −BH) + (1− πE)u(P )− v(E) ≥ uD(I, BH , BL, P ), (17)
where uD(I, BH , BL, P ) is deﬁned by the maximization problem (14).
We can now characterize the equilibrium allocation of the entrepreneur, the
implied utility attained, the structure of the optimal contract oﬀered by the bank,
and the contract which constitutes the optimal deviation for the entrepreneur in
the secondary credit market.
Let u∗ denote the utility associated with the equilibrium allocation of the econ-
omy with exclusive contracts and no bankruptcy institution, u∗∗ denote the utility
associated with the equilibrium allocation of the economy with non-exclusive con-
tracts and no bankruptcy institution, and u+ the utility associated with the equi-
librium allocation of the economy with non-exclusive contracts and a bankruptcy
institution.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then the entrepreneur prefers
the optimal contract with non-exclusive contracts and bankruptcy to the optimal
contract with non-exclusive contracts and no bankruptcy; but he prefers the optimal
22Notice that because we assume that secondary lenders share the proceeds in bankruptcy
equally, we can ignore the strategic interaction among secondary lenders and proceed as if there
is only one secondary lender. In fact, it is not possible for yet another lender to enter and oﬀer
an additional loan that induces bankruptcy, earns non-negative expected proﬁts and makes
the entrepreneur better oﬀ. The additional lender could only make the entrepreneur better
oﬀ, while ensuring non-negative expected proﬁts for himself, if he had an externality on the
secondary lenders. But if RH < 1/2(cH − P ), then the secondary lenders get fully repaid even
if the borrower declares bankruptcy and thus there is no externality. But since the aggregate
repayment RH can be implemented by loans from more than one lender, say n lenders, and we
can choose n such that RH < n/(n + 1)(cH − P ), it is possible to implement any aggregate
repayment RH while avoiding externalities from additional lenders.
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contract with exclusive contracts and no bankruptcy to the optimal contract with
a secondary credit market and bankruptcy:
u∗∗ < u+ < u∗. (18)
In the case in which there is a secondary credit market and exclusive contracts
are not enforceable, the possibility of bankruptcy relaxes the incentive constraints.
Bankruptcy allows the bank to ensure that the entrepreneur does no end up with
funds exceeding a ﬁxed amount P . The bank chooses a notional repayment in state
L which is suﬃciently high that the entrepreneur will declare bankruptcy in that
state. The entrepreneur has no incentive to enter into contracts with secondary
lenders which pay oﬀ in the low state. Since he declares bankruptcy in that state,
any such payoﬀ which would give the entrepreneur a consumption level exceeding
the bankruptcy protection P would go towards repaying the bank. In addition,
since the bank can ensure that the debt in the secondary credit market is not
repaid unless the bank has been fully repaid, the secondary lenders would in fact
not be repaid in that state. Thus, they would not lend to the entrepreneur against
the promise of repayment in the low state. This restricts the set of contracts that
the secondary lenders can oﬀer while making non-negative expected proﬁts to
those that require repayment in state H . To sum up, bankruptcy in state L implies
that the entrepreneur has no incentive to save into state L using the secondary
market and can not borrow against state L in secondary markets either. In this
sense, the ability of the bank to enforce its claim on the borrower’s funds in excess
of the bankruptcy protection level in bankruptcy enables the bank to eﬀectively
enforce exclusivity in state L. Hence, the incentive constraints are relaxed and
the optimal contract when bankruptcy is allowed for is preferred to the optimal
contract when bankruptcy is not allowed for.
The institution of bankruptcy does not completely substitute for the enforce-
ability of exclusive contracts. In particular, the entrepreneur can still borrow
against and save into state H using secondary markets. Thus, the repayment
schedule of the loan from the bank must be such that the entrepreneur has no
incentive to choose eﬀort e and supplement the contract oﬀered by the bank with
contracts oﬀered by secondary lenders which require repayment in state H . This
constrains the contracts oﬀered by the bank relative to the contracts oﬀered in
the case in which there is no secondary credit market and exclusive contracts are
enforceable.
We have analyzed the problem with bankruptcy under the assumption that
secondary lenders share the proceeds in bankruptcy equally. It is important how-
ever to notice that our main result, namely Proposition 5, is independent of that
assumption. Clearly, given that the institution of bankruptcy is welfare improv-
ing taking our assumption about the sharing rule as given, it would be welfare
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improving if we were allowed to choose the sharing rule in the secondary markets.
But, no matter what the sharing rule, there cannot be an equilibrium in which
the existence of the secondary markets does not impose any constraints on the
set of contracts which can be oﬀered by the bank. If the bank oﬀers the optimal
exclusive contract, it is never an equilibrium for the secondary market to be in-
active. Thus, the exclusive contract cannot be implemented no matter what the
sharing rule in the secondary market. How to design the optimal sharing rule in
the secondary market is an interesting open question.
The characterization of the optimal contract can be summarized as follows:
The optimal contract induces bankruptcy in state L and only in state L (as es-
tablished above). Furthermore, denoting the optimal contract by (I+, B+H , B
+
L , P ),
the bank can choose the notional repayment B+L so that B
+
L = B
+
H . To see why,
notice that by setting B+L ≥ B+H the bank makes non-negative expected proﬁts
even if the entrepreneur does not declare bankruptcy in state L. Thus, the en-
trepreneur cannot proﬁt from avoiding bankruptcy in state L. Setting B+L equal
to B+H is hence suﬃcient. The point is that it is not necessary to set the notional
repayment in the low state B+L higher than the repayment in the high state B
+
H ,
which would be unrealistic.
The possibility of bankruptcy, we argued, relaxes the incentive constraints.
As a consequence, the optimal contract in this case provides more insurance to
the entrepreneur. Furthermore, if u′′′ > 0, the amount of the loan that the
borrower gets from the bank under the optimal contract with bankruptcy exceeds
the amount he gets if there is no bankruptcy institution.
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and assume that contractual rela-
tionships are non-exclusive. Then:
(i) If u′′′ > 0, then c+0 > c
∗∗
0 .
(ii) c∗∗H − c∗∗L > c+H − c+L and c∗∗H > c+H .
The intuition is as follows: As argued in Section 3.2, when there is a secondary
market but no bankruptcy institution, the bank reduces the amount of insurance
provided to the entrepreneur to make it costly for him to trade in secondary
markets. When there is a bankruptcy institution, the entrepreneur’s trades in
the secondary market are restricted as discussed above. Given these reduced
incentives to trade in secondary markets, the bank provides more insurance and
may lend more than in the absence of bankruptcy.
We now characterize the equilibrium deviation, that is the best possible con-
tract which can be oﬀered in equilibrium in the secondary market or, in other
words, the solution to the maximization problem (14).
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Proposition 7 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and assume that contractual re-
lationships are non-exclusive. In the economy with bankruptcy, the equilibrium
deviation of the entrepreneur in the secondary market satisﬁes γ = πeRH > 0.
The proof is straightforward and is hence omitted. The entrepreneur thus con-
siders taking out an additional loan in the secondary market. Again, this is in
contrast to the standard result in the literature which implies that the agent would
consider saving an extra amount. The intuition for our result is that since the
debtor declares bankruptcy in the low state and additional assets are seized, there
is no point in carrying extra resources into that state. The debtor is hence con-
sidering deviations involving time 0 and the high state at time 1 only. Given that,
he is tempted to borrow more against the good state at time 1. Thus, the optimal
contract is designed to keep the borrower from incurring excessive liabilities rather
than to keep the borrower from saving too much in secondary markets.
4 Discussion
Our modeling of credit markets and of the institution of bankruptcy is clearly
simpliﬁed in several dimensions. In this section we discuss what appear to be our
most restrictive assumptions and their implications as well as possible extensions
of our analysis.
In our analysis the optimal design of the bankruptcy institution coincides with
the optimal contract between the primary lender and the borrower. We would
need to introduce heterogeneity of the borrowers and/or their projects in order
to analyze the optimal contract independently from the bankruptcy institution.
Notice that individual characteristics would aﬀect the optimal bankruptcy protec-
tion level in our model. If such ex ante heterogeneity is not appropriately taken
into account in bankruptcy law, the institution of bankruptcy may not be welfare
improving and may in fact be welfare reducing at least for some borrowers.
We have abstracted from several important aspects of bankruptcy. For exam-
ple, in our model there is no distinction between the borrower declaring bank-
ruptcy and the lender putting the borrower into bankruptcy. In practice, there
is a distinction in the law and it would be interesting to explain the rationale for
the two provisions. Relatedly, bankruptcy laws in many countries allocate control
rights to lenders when bankruptcy is declared. In our model, there is no ineﬃ-
ciency in leaving the project in the hands of the borrower and hence we interpret
the allocation of control rights to the insider in Chapter 11 simply as a way to
insure the insider. Clearly, if one were to add such an ineﬃciency to the model,
this would provide a countervailing force and might explain the provisions which
allocate control rights to the lenders. Notice however that as our model stands,
lenders would not prefer more stringent bankruptcy provisions ex ante.
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We have assumed that contracts with secondary lenders are honored in bank-
ruptcy. If we allowed for bankruptcy procedures which do not honor contracts
in secondary markets, Pareto improvements in the equilibrium allocation may be
possible.23 This is a consequence of our simplifying assumption that secondary
credit has no intrinsic role in the economy. More generally, if secondary credit had
a non-degenerate role in the economy, as for example in the case of trade credit,
then our assumption that secondary credit contracts are honored in bankruptcy,
as long as the bank has been repaid, would be more appropriate. Notice also that
we study an environment in which exclusive contracts are optimal. In general,
this may not be the case for example when there is an ex post holdup problem in
an exclusive relationship as discussed in Sharpe (1990).
Relatedly, we have assumed that secondary lenders share the bankruptcy pro-
ceeds equally whenever they receive some reimbursement. In fact the sharing rule
for secondary lenders should be considered a part of the design of the bankruptcy
institution similar to the insurance provision P. Solving for the optimal sharing
rule as part of the optimal contract between the bank and the borrower in our
set-up would require an explicit analysis of the strategic interaction between sec-
ondary lenders – a daunting task. Our analysis is however robust to this extension
insofar as the equilibrium allocation which can be achieved with non-exclusivity
and bankruptcy, even allowing for the optimal choice of the sharing rule for sec-
ondary lenders, does not coincide with the equilibrium allocation which is achieved
with exclusivity and no bankruptcy. This is true since in our set-up the allocation
induced by exclusive contracts can be replicated only if bankruptcy is declared in
state L but not in state H . But if bankruptcy is declared only in state L, it is
never an equilibrium for the secondary market to be inactive.
While our assumption about the sharing rule allows us to abstract from the
strategic interaction of secondary lenders, which is important for tractability, this
does not mean that we consider the coordination problem among multiple lenders
unimportant in practice. Indeed, the role of bankruptcy in alleviating this co-
ordination problem has been studied in the literature.24 Notice that in our en-
vironment, since there is only one lender in equilibrium, coordination problems
among secondary lenders which constrain the secondary credit market would ac-
tually improve matters. It would however be an interesting extension to study an
environment with multiple lenders in equilibrium in which bankruptcy alleviates
exclusivity and coordination problems at the same time.
The focus of this paper is on the lack of enforceability of exclusivity ex ante,
i.e., outside bankruptcy. In fact, in our model when bankruptcy is declared there
23But notice that this allocation would still be dominated by the optimal allocation with
exclusivity and our main conclusion would be unaﬀected.
24See, e.g., Morris and Shin (2004). See also footnote 4.
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is no further contracting. In practice, borrowers often require and obtain ad-
ditional ﬁnancing after bankruptcy is declared, so called debtor-in-possession ﬁ-
nancing. Moreover, a number of debt covenants, including exclusivity covenants,
lose enforceability with respect to further ﬁnancing once the borrower declares
bankruptcy. While we do not study this aspect of bankruptcy law, we think that
the modeling approach provided here could be extended to address the eﬀect of
these provisions.
We have restricted the insurance provision in bankruptcy, P , to be state in-
dependent. As we noted earlier, this restriction is meant to capture the costs of
bankruptcy. The restriction is crucial in our analysis since without it the bank
would be able to enforce a speciﬁc consumption allocation for the entrepreneur in
all states and the optimal exclusive contract could hence be implemented. This
is solely due to the fact that we do not introduce explicit costs associated with
the bankruptcy procedure. An economy in which bankruptcy is directly associ-
ated with the costly enforcement of exclusivity would however share most of the
equilibrium properties with the economy studied here. Alternatively, the state-
independence of P could be motivated by considering an economy in which the
courts do not observe the realization of the state and hence can not enforce a
level of bankruptcy protection contingent on it. Notice also that if there were
more than two output realizations, our main results, namely that bankruptcy
occurs when output is low, is welfare improving but not a perfect substitute for
exclusivity and that borrowers are tempted to borrow more in secondary markets,
would be unaﬀected, although the assumption that P is state independent would
be more restrictive in this case.
Finally, our result that bankruptcy is not a perfect substitute for exclusivity
contrasts with the result derived by Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) in an interesting
and closely related paper. They study the problem of a principal employing an
agent who can borrow and lend as well as default on loans. They show that
there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection levels that attain
constrained eﬃciency, i.e., the optimal exclusive allocation can be implemented
when bankruptcy is allowed. Two important properties diﬀerentiate the environ-
ment studied by Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) from ours and are instrumental in
generating their eﬃciency result. First, the cash ﬂows from the project accrue to
the principal and thus the transfer between the principal and the agent is a wage
payment from the principal to the agent which is not aﬀected by the bankruptcy
procedure. In particular, the agent cannot default on the principal, but only
on the “secondary” lenders. Second, only borrowing and lending contracts are
considered in the secondary credit market and contracts that explicitly provide
insurance are not allowed, which reduces the set of feasible deviations.
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5 Conclusion
We provide a rationale for the institution of bankruptcy. The institution of bank-
ruptcy enables the enforcement of a primary lender’s claim to any assets that
the borrower has above the bankruptcy protection level. In the absence of en-
forceability of exclusive contracts ex ante there is a role for such an institution.
Bankruptcy thus relaxes the constraints imposed by the lack of enforceability and
alleviates the non-exclusivity problem. This means in particular that the bor-
rower can not use secondary markets to insure himself against states in which
he declares bankruptcy since the primary lender could claim such assets. Thus,
a bankruptcy institution improves on non-exclusive contractual relationships by
eﬀectively enabling the primary lender to enforce a speciﬁc consumption alloca-
tion when bankruptcy is declared. However, the institution of bankruptcy is not
a perfect substitute for exclusivity, that is, it is not equivalent to being able to
enforce a speciﬁc consumption allocation in all states. At an abstract level, the
paper studies a principal agent problem in which the agent can enter into “side
contracts,” but a primary contracting party can partially enforce its contract and
seize payoﬀs of “side contracts” in some states of the world.
We characterize the implications for the optimal contract and the side contracts
that an agent would consider. The institution of bankruptcy allows the agent to
obtain a contract which provides him with more insurance and, under certain
conditions, with a larger loan than in the absence of bankruptcy. Moreover, we
show that in our model, in contrast to the standard result in the literature, the
agent would consider taking out additional loans in secondary markets instead of
saving.
The paper focuses on the role of bankruptcy in alleviating the non-exclusivity
problem. In doing so, we have to abstract from several important issues aﬀecting
the determination of optimal bankruptcy law, such as borrower heterogeneity, the
allocation of control rights, coordination problems, and the question of whether
the borrower or the lender declares bankruptcy. It would be interesting to consider
these aspects jointly with the non-exclusivity problem, but this is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The paper proceeds formally as if the level of bankruptcy protection is part of
the contract and hence the optimal contract in a sense determines the bankruptcy
law. However, the essential diﬀerence between bankruptcy law and contractual
default provisions is that the former applies to all contracts an agent enters into.
This distinction becomes important when the contractual relationships of all par-
ties in a contract are not observable. Indeed, the role which bankruptcy plays
in our model is to limit the externalities across contracts when the subsequent
contractual relationships of the parties in a contract are not otherwise observable.
This might explain why bankruptcy law does not allow agents to “opt out.”
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that Assumptions 2-3 guarantee that the set of
(I, BH, BL) which satisfy the set of constraints, equations (2-3), is non-empty. The
constraint set is compact, the objective function continuous, and hence a solution
exists. Letting µ and τ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation
(2) and (3), respectively, the necessary ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are
(2), (3) and
u′(α + I − 1) = µ (19)
u′(ωH −BH)
(
1 + τ
πE − πe
πE
)
= µ (20)
u′(ωL − BL)
(
1− τ πE − πe
1− πE
)
= µ. (21)
Since u′(c) is decreasing, by concavity of u(c), (20-21) imply that cH > cL.
Simple algebraic manipulation of the ﬁrst order conditions, (19-21), implies:
1
u′(c0)
= πE
1
u′(cH)
+ (1− πE) 1
u′(cL)
.
Thus, expected consumption is decreasing if 1/u′ is convex and increasing other-
wise. The above equality also implies that u′(c0) < πEu′(cH) + (1− πE)u′(cL). 
Proof of Lemma 1. While (6) must hold for all (γ,RH , RL) which satisfy (7),
it is suﬃcient to impose it for (γ,RH , RL) which solve:
max
γ,RH ,RL
u(α + I + γ − 1) + πeu(ωH − BH − RH) + (1− πe)u(ωL − BL − RL)
subject to (7). It is easy to see that the argmaximum of this problem is reached
at (γ,RH , RL) which solve
c ≡ α + I + γ − 1 = ωH − BH − RH = ωL − BL − RL
=
1
2
(α + I − 1 + πe(ωH − BH) + (1− πe)(ωL −BL))
which proves part (i).
If (I, BH , BL) satisﬁes (8), then
u(α + I − 1) + πEu(ωH −BH) + (1− πE)u(ωL − BL)− v(E)
≥ 2u
(
1
2
(α + I − 1 + πe(ωH − BH) + (1− πe)(ωL −BL))
)
− v(e)
> u(α + I − 1) + πeu(ωH − BH) + (1− πe)u(ωL − BL)− v(e)
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which means that (I, BH , BL) satisﬁes (3). Notice that the last inequality is strict
since ωH − BH > ωL −BL, and thus (6) is (strictly) more restrictive than (3). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let µ and τ denote the Lagrange multipliers asso-
ciated with equation (5) and (8), respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions of the
maximization problem are (5), (8), (9) and
u′(α + I − 1) = µ˜ (22)
u′(ωH − BH) + u′(c)τ˜ πE − πe
πE
= µ˜ (23)
u′(ωL −BL)− u′(c)τ˜ πE − πe
1− πE = µ˜ (24)
where
µ˜ ≡ µ
1 + τ
+
τ
1 + τ
u′(c) (25)
and τ˜ ≡ τ/(1+ τ). As a consequence, u′(ωH−BH) < u′(α+ I−1) < u′(ωL−BL),
and hence ωH − BH > α + I − 1 > ωL −BL. Also, simply manipulating the ﬁrst
order conditions:
u′(α + I − 1) = πEu′(ωH − BH) + (1− πE)u′(ωL −BL). (26)
The statement on precautionary savings now simply follows from (26). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i): The present (expected) value of consump-
tion, c0+πEcH +(1−πE)cL, is constant across the two cases (with or without the
secondary credit market operating). But, Proposition 1 (and Rogerson’s (1985) re-
sult) imply that in the absence of a secondary credit market c∗0 ≥ πEc∗H+(1−πE)c∗L.
On the other hand, Proposition 2 implies that when there is a secondary credit
market c∗∗0 < πEc
∗∗
H + (1 − πE)c∗∗L . The consumption at time t = 0 must then be
lower when there is a secondary credit market, and so is I.
Part (ii): The proof is in 3 steps. Step 1: We claim that (c∗∗H , c
∗∗
L ) ≤ (c∗H , c∗L).
Suppose instead that (c∗∗H , c
∗∗
L ) ≤ (c∗H , c∗L) and hence c∗∗0 ≥ c∗0 since the present
value of both consumption allocations has to be the same. But then
u′(c∗0) ≥ u′(c∗∗0 ) = πEu′(c∗∗H ) + (1− πE)u′(c∗∗L ) ≥ πEu′(c∗H) + (1− πE)u′(c∗L),
which contradicts Proposition 1. Step 2: In the case of no secondary credit market
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding at an optimal solution and implies
that
u(c∗H)− u(c∗L) =
v(E)− v(e)
πE − πe .
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When there is a secondary credit market, the incentive compatibility constraint
evaluated at an optimal solution implies
1/2u(c∗∗0 ) + πE/2u(c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πE)/2u(c∗∗L )− 1/2v(E)
≥ u(1/2c∗∗0 + πe/2c∗∗H + (1− πe)/2c∗∗L )− 1/2v(e)
> 1/2u(c∗∗0 ) + πe/2u(c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πe)/2u(c∗∗L )− 1/2v(e)
and thus
u(c∗∗H )− u(c∗∗L ) >
v(E)− v(e)
πE − πe = u(c
∗
H)− u(c∗L). (27)
Now suppose that c∗∗H ≤ c∗H and thus c∗∗L ≥ c∗L by step 1. This contradicts equation
(27) and hence c∗∗H > c
∗
H , i.e., the second assertion of part (ii) is established. Step
3: c∗∗H > c
∗
H together with equation (27) imply the ﬁrst assertion. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the entrepreneur would fully insure and per-
fectly smooth, γ = 1/2(πec
∗∗
H + (1− πe)c∗∗L − c∗∗0 ). If u′ is concave, c∗∗0 > πEc∗∗H +
(1− πE)c∗∗L > πec∗∗H + (1− πe)c∗∗L and thus γ < 0. As long as u′ is not too convex,
u′(c∗∗0 ) < πeu
′(c∗∗H )+(1−πe)u′(c∗∗L ) will imply that u′(c∗∗0 ) < u′(πec∗∗H +(1−πe)c∗∗L ),
i.e., c∗∗0 > πec
∗∗
H + (1− πe)c∗∗L and γ < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. To show that u+ < u∗ it suﬃces to show that
∂
(
u(c∗0 + γ) + πeu(c
∗
H − γπe ) + (1− πe)u(c∗L)
)
∂γ
> 0,
at γ = 0, which is straightforward to check.
To see that u+ > u∗∗, notice that since (c∗∗0 , c
∗∗
H , c
∗∗
L ) satisﬁes the incentive
compatibility constraint with non-exclusive contracts and no bankruptcy we have:
u(c∗∗0 ) + πEu(c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πE)u(c∗∗L )− v(E)
= 2u(1/2c∗∗0 + πe/2c
∗∗
H + (1− πe)/2c∗∗L )− v(e)
> (1 + πe)u(1/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πe)u(c∗∗L )− v(e),
and thus (c∗∗0 , c
∗∗
H , c
∗∗
L ) is incentive compatible with non-exclusivity and bankruptcy
by setting P = c∗∗L , BL > ωL − P and such that πeBH + (1 − πe)BL ≥ I, and
BH and BL supporting c
∗∗
0 , c
∗∗
H , respectively. Since c
∗∗
L < c
∗∗
0 < c
∗∗
H (see the Proof
of Proposition 2), the last inequality is strict and thus there exists a feasible and
incentive compatible allocation with non-exclusive contracts and bankruptcy that
improves the objective. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We will ﬁrst prove part (ii) and then part (i) of
the proposition.
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Part (ii): Ignoring the constraint that ωH − BH − RH ≥ P for now, we have
the following explicit expression for uD:
uD(I, BH , BL, P ) = (1 + πe)u(
1
1 + πe
(α + I − 1) + πe
1 + πe
(ωH −BH))
+ (1− πe)u(P )− v(e).
The ﬁrst order conditions for the problem with bankruptcy are thus:
(1 + τ)u′(α + I − 1) = µ + τu′(c)
(1 + τ)u′(ωH − BH) = µ + τ πe
πE
u′(c)
(1 + τ)u′(P ) = µ + τ
1− πe
1− πE u
′(P )
where c = 1/(1 + πe)(α + I − 1) + πe/(1 + πe)(ωH − BH) and µ and τ are the
multipliers on the constraints. Clearly, u′(ωH − BH) < u′(α + I − 1) and thus
u′(c) < u′(α+I−1). Hence, u′(α+I−1) < (1+τ)u′(α+I−1)−τu′(c) = µ. But
then the last ﬁrst order condition implies that u′(P ) > µ and thus c+H > c
+
0 > c
+
L .
Setting u′(α+I−1) equal to a weighted sum of the second two ﬁrst order conditions
shows that
u′(c+0 ) < πEu
′(c+H) + (1− πE)u′(c+L).
An argument analogous to the one in the ﬁrst step of the proof of Proposition 3
establishes that (c∗∗H , c
∗∗
L ) ≤ (c+H , c+L).
The incentive compatibility constraint of the problem with bankruptcy implies
u(c+0 ) + πEu(c
+
H) + (1− πE)u(c+L)− v(E) =
(1 + πe)u(1/(1 + πe)c
+
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
+
H) + (1− πe)u(c+L)− v(e),
and the incentive compatibility constraint of the problem without bankruptcy
implies
u(c∗∗0 ) + πEu(c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πE)u(c∗∗L )− v(E) =
2u(1/2c∗∗0 + πe/2c
∗∗
H + (1− πe)/2c∗∗L )− v(e)
> (1 + πe)u(1/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πe)u(c∗∗L )− v(e),
and thus
(1 + πe)u(1/(1 + πe)c
+
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
+
H) + (1− πe)u(c+L) > (28)
(1 + πe)u(1/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
H ) + (1− πe)u(c∗∗L ).
Denote the present value of a consumption allocation given action a by PVa.
Recall that PV +E = PV
∗∗
E . Note that PVe = PVE − (πE − πe)(cH − cL). Suppose
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that, by contradiction, c∗∗H − c∗∗L ≤ c+H − c+L and hence PV ∗∗e ≥ PV +e . Equation
(28) then implies that
1/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
∗∗
H > 1/(1 + πe)c
+
0 + πe/(1 + πe)c
+
H > c
+
L > c
∗∗
L ,
since otherwise a lottery with lower expected value would never be preferred. But
then c∗∗H > c
+
H , a contradiction.
Part (i): Recall that the present (expected) value of consumption conditional
on the high eﬀort is the same in the two cases and that u′(c∗∗0 ) = πEu
′(c∗∗H ) + (1−
πE)u
′(c∗∗L ) and u
′(c+0 ) < πEu
′(c+H) + (1− πE)u′(c+L). If u′′′ > 0, then c∗∗0 < πEc∗∗H +
(1− πE)c∗∗L . Given part (ii) established above, c∗∗H − c∗∗L > c+H − c+L and c∗∗H > c+H .
Suppose c+0 < c
∗∗
0 and hence c
+
L > c
∗∗
L . Then πEc
+
H+(1−πE)c+L > πEc∗∗H +(1−πE)c∗∗L
and thus
u′(c∗∗0 ) = πEu
′(c∗∗H ) + (1− πE)u′(c∗∗L )
> πEu
′(c+H) + (1− πE)u′(c+L) > u′(c+0 ).
But this implies c+0 > c
∗∗
0 , a contradiction.
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